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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-
2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the district court properly dismiss plaintiff-appellant Lynn Foster's ("Lynn") 
claims for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings and slander of title against his ex-
wife's lawyer, defendants-appellants Evelyn Saunders and the law firm of Saunders & 
Saunders (collectively herein, "Saunders") for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted? 
When determining whether the trial court correctly granted a motion to dismiss, 
the Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and considers them, and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. MFS Series Trust HI v. Grainger, 2004 UT 61, ^ 6. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading 
thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses 
may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 2001, Lynn, an attorney, was the respondent in a divorce proceeding initiated 
by his then-wife, Cathie Foster ("Cathie"). As in many divorces, Lynn and Cathie 
contested the distribution of property of the marital estate. In particular, Cathie filed an 
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affidavit expressing her belief that "one or both of the parties have an interest in the 
following properties . . . ." (R. 31.) The affidavit then listed a handful of properties, the 
ownership of which was litigated. (Id.) At trial, the court found that Cathie was entitled 
to an interest in the majority of the properties listed in her affidavit, but that she was not 
entitled to an interest in certain other of the properties determined to be owned by two 
Foster family limited liability companies. Lynn was manager of one of the two entities, 
Foster Rentals, L.L.C. ("Foster Rentals") and Lynn's sons owned the other, Foster 
Family, L.L.C. ("Foster Family"). (R. 106, 109.) 
For reasons apparently motivated by spite rather than any economic loss, the 
Foster entities each filed separate lawsuits against Cathie to quiet title to certain of the 
properties identified by Cathie in her affidavit filed in the divorce action. That, of course, 
proved unnecessary given the court's ruling in the divorce proceeding that Cathie was not 
entitled to certain of those properties. Nonetheless, the quiet title action resulted in the 
entry of two final judgments. (Am. Compl. ff 17, 30, 34; R. 21, 23, 24, 116-118.) 
Not satisfied with winning the dispute over the properties held in the name of the 
Foster family entities, Lynn then obtained an assignment of claims from those entities 
and subsequently filed the action from which this appeal is taken. In his complaint, Lynn 
asserts that Cathie's affidavit in the divorce proceeding — in which she expressed the 
belief that either she or Lynn owned an interest in properties, some of which were 
determined to be owned by the Foster LLCs — was actionable under the torts of 
wrongful initiation of legal proceedings and slander of title. (See Am. Compl. ^f 12-16, 
21-28, 30, 34; R. 20, 22-23, 24.) Lynn named not only his ex-wife in the lawsuit, but 
also his ex-wife's divorce lawyer, Evelyn Saunders and her Park City law office, as well 
as an expert witness who testified for Cathie in the divorce proceeding. Lynn's theory, in 
other words, is that arguing entitlement to property in a divorce proceeding, as Cathie 
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did, comes with the risk that losing the argument constitutes tortious conduct not only for 
the loser, but for her attorney and expert witnesses as well. 
In light of these allegations and circumstances, Saunders filed a motion to dismiss 
Lynn's complaint. She argued, and the trial court correctly found, that the judicial 
proceedings privilege bars the complaint because its claims arise out of Cathie's allegedly 
slanderous statements in her affidavit, filed in the course of the divorce proceeding. 
Moreover, although Lynn failed to identify any other "meritless theories" below, the trial 
court also correctly concluded that "meritless theories," however articulated, if made in 
the course of a properly initiated lawsuit cannot form the basis for a claim for the 
wrongful initiation of civil proceedings as a matter of law. Finally, the trial court also 
correctly determined that the slander of title claims are barred by the doctrine of claim 
preclusion and by the applicable statute of limitations, and dismissed each of Lynn's 
claims against Saunders. (R. 453.) 
Still discontented, Lynn filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing 
that a California decision (which predated oral argument on Saunders' motion to dismiss 
by nearly a decade) constituted intervening and controlling authority sufficient to set 
aside the trial court's decision. (R. 641.) The trial court correctly rejected this further 
argument, denying Lynn's motion. (R. 1219.) 
Lynn now appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 24, 2001, Judge Hilder entered his ruling in Lynn and 
Cathie's divorce action. Saunders represented Cathie in the divorce. Like any party to a 
divorce, Cathie also sought judicial valuation and division of the marital estate. (R. 103-
115.) 
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2. In the course of the divorce, Cathie submitted an affidavit asserting that she 
believed that she "and/or" Lynn owned interests in a list of eleven real properties. (Am. 
Compl. ^ 12, 13, 17; R. 20-21.) In the Ruling, Judge Hilder considered the ownership 
issues raised by the parties therein and found that Cathie indeed owned one-half of 92% 
of Foster Rentals, an entity that held title to the majority of the properties listed in 
Cathie's affidavit. (R. 107-109.) Judge Hilder further found that another of the 
properties listed in the affidavit — the couple's former residence — was a "joint asset" of 
the marriage. (R. 104.) Finally, Judge Hilder ordered Lynn (as manager of Foster 
Rentals), to remain "accountable to [Cathie] as a significant owner, along with the other 
members of the LLC, until her interest [in Foster Rentals] is satisfied." (R. 109.) 
3. Based on Cathie's statement that she "and/or" Lynn had an ownership 
interest in the listed properties, the Foster Rentals and Foster Family L.L.C.s filed two 
additional lawsuits against Cathie to quiet title in the L.L.C.s. Lynn alleges that Foster 
Rentals obtained a judgment and decree against Cathie quieting title on July 30, 2001. 
(Am. Compl. f 17; R. 21.) Foster Family likewise obtained a "Judgment Quieting Title 
and for Dismissal of Remaining Claims with Prejudice" on May 3, 2001. (R. 116-118.) 
4. On January 31, 2003, Lynn filed the third lawsuit arising out of the divorce, 
this time naming Cathie's former lawyer, Evelyn Saunders, and Cathie's expert witness 
in the divorce case, Gary Couillard, as defendants, in addition to Cathie. (Compl.; R. 2-3, 
5-11.) Lynn amended the complaint on February 6, 2003. (Am. Compl.; R. 17.) 
5. Lynn's amended complaint alleges three claims against Saunders, for 
"wrongful initiation, use and/or continuation of civil proceedings," as well as two slander 
of title claims, "assigned" to Lynn by the Foster entities, Foster Rentals and Foster 
Family. (Am. Compl. ffl 21-36; R. 22-25.) 
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6. Lynn alleges that Saunders committed the tort of wrongful initiation of civil 
proceedings by raising "meritless theories, bereft of any legitimate basis in either law, 
fact, or both" on behalf of Cathie in the divorce. (Am. Compl. ffl[ 9, 12, 22, 26; R. 19, 20, 
22.) The only "meritless" theory that Lynn identified in his complaint, however, was that 
Cathie stated in her affidavit that she "and/or Lynn held some ownership interest in 
certain real estate owned by [Foster Rentals], and in other real estate owned by [Foster 
Family], which Cathie had quit-claimed to the contrary." (See Am. Compl. fflf 12-16; R. 
20.) 
7. The slander of title claims Lynn received from Foster Rentals and Foster 
Family are likewise "based entirely" on the "meritless allegation" in Cathie's affidavit 
"slandering [Foster Rentals] and [Foster Family's] good and marketable title." (Am. 
Compl. ffl[ 30, 32, 34, 36; R. 23-24, 132.) 
8. On March 25, 2003, Saunders moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims 
were barred by the judicial proceedings privilege. (R. 88, 91-95.) Saunders also moved 
to dismiss the wrongful initiation claim on the ground that Lynn could not make out the 
elements of the tort because the "civil proceeding" at issue, the divorce, was not 
wrongful, and his claim instead was based on the assertion of "meritless theories" therein. 
(R. 94.) Saunders also argued that Lynn's assigned slander of title claims were barred 
both by the doctrine of claim preclusion and by the applicable statute of limitations. (R. 
95-98.) 
9. On October 6, 2003, the Honorable William B. Bohling entered an order 
dismissing Lynn's claims against Saunders with prejudice for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted, holding that Lynn's wrongful initiation of civil 
proceedings claim was "barred by the judicial proceedings privilege and because the tort 
applies to the wrongful institution of civil proceedings, not arguments, as a matter of 
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law[.]" (R. 453.) The trial court further held that Lynn's slander of title claims were 
"barred by the judicial proceedings privilege, by the doctrine of claim preclusion, and by 
the one year statute of limitation for libel and slander, set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-29(4)[.]" (R. 453.) 
10. Lynn moved to alter or amend Judge Bohling's order on April 8, 2004, 
arguing that a California decision issued almost ten years before oral argument on 
Saunders' motion, Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083 (Cal. 1994), constituted 
intervening and controlling authority justifying reversal. Judge Bohling denied Lynn's 
motion on May 24, 2004. (R. 1219-1220.) 
11. Lynn filed the notice of appeal herein on June 21, 2004, seeking 
reinstitution of his claims. (R. 1221.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As the trial court correctly found below, even a superficial view of Lynn's 
complaint exposes a danger that no court reasonably could tolerate. If Lynn has viable 
causes of action against Saunders here, then any spouse and any lawyer who 
unsuccessfully claim interests in real property in a contested divorce proceeding 
automatically would face a wrongful initiation or slander of title claim. Every divorce 
action would contain built-in tort actions against the spouse who loses the property battle, 
and against that spouse's lawyer. In fact, under Lynn's construction of the law, every 
party to every lawsuit would face multiple follow-on lawsuits for every factual or legal 
assertion the finder of fact ultimately rejects, regardless of the outcome of the underlying 
suit. For obvious reasons, this is not the law. 
Lynn's claims fail for a host of independent additional reasons as well. His claim 
against Saunders and the other defendants for the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings 
fails as a matter of law because the tort requires for its premise the bringing of "civil 
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proceedings" — a lawsuit — without probable cause to do so, and simply does not apply 
to the advancement of "meritless theories" and arguments made within what is otherwise 
a properly initiated suit. Moreover, because Lynn's complaint is clear that all of his 
claims against Saunders depend on Cathie's statements in her affidavit filed in the 
divorce, the "absolute" judicial proceedings privilege bars those claims as well. Even if 
the foregoing were not true, the trial court also correctly found that Lynn's slander of title 
claims (for which Lynn's assignors previously obtained final judgments) are barred under 
the doctrine of claim preclusion, and further are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
Judge Bohling, upon reviewing Lynn's complaint, his papers in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss, and the arguments of his lawyer at hearing, and after consideration of 
Lynn's additional arguments raised in his post-judgment motion to alter or amend, 
correctly determined that Lynn cannot state claims for wrongful initiation of civil 
proceedings and for slander of title, and properly dismissed this most recent attempt to 
relitigate what was clearly a bitter divorce as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED LYNN'S CLAIM FOR 
WRONGFUL INITIATION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BECAUSE THE 
TORT DOES NOT APPLY TO ARGUMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE 
OF A PROPERLY INITIATED LITIGATION. 
Lynn's complaint is clear that he believes that Saunders (and the other defendants) 
should be liable to him for committing the tort of wrongful initiation of civil proceedings 
because they "initiated, used and/or asserted meritless theories" in the Fosters' divorce. 
(Am. Compl. | 9; R. 19.) (emphasis added). Specifically, Lynn alleges that "Saunders 
and Couillard entered into an agreement with each other with respect to the advancement 
of these misplaced theories" and then sets forth snippets from Judge Hilder's ruling after 
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the former couple's divorce trial, wherein he observed that defendants advanced what he 
described as '"novel"' theories. (Am. Compl. H 10-11; R. 19-20.) The only allegedly 
"meritless theory" that Lynn identifies in his complaint, however, was that Saunders 
"caused" Cathie to file an affidavit in which Cathie asserted that she "and/or Lynn held 
some ownership interest in certain real estate owned by [Foster Rentals], and in other real 
estate owned by [Foster Family], which Cathie had quitclaimed to the contrary." (Am. 
Compl. 11 12-16; R. 20.) 
Of course, as Judge Bohling correctly found, the tort of wrongful initiation of civil 
proceedings does not apply to "meritless" theories or arguments made in a lawsuit, as 
Lynn claims, nor should it. First, Lynn fails to identify even one Utah decision applying 
the tort to create liability merely for arguments made in a lawsuit. To the contrary, as 
Saunders argued below, every wrongful initiation of civil proceedings (sometimes 
referred to in the caselaw as "malicious prosecution" or "abuse of process") decision we 
have identified in Utah has been founded upon the wrongful bringing of a lawsuit, never 
the proffer of allegedly "meritless" arguments or positions. Indeed, the Utah Supreme 
Court has expressly stated that an action for "wrongful bringing of civil proceedings . . . 
is recognized only when the civil suit is shown to have been brought without probable 
cause, for the purpose of harassment or annoyance; and it is usually said to require 
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malice." Baird v. Intermountain School Fed. Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 
1976) (emphasis added).1 
The decisions of this Court are equally clear. In Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 
955 P.2d 357, 367 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court observed that "'[a]n action 
challenging the initiation of a lawsuit is an action for malicious prosecution or for 
wrongful bringing of civil proceedings . . . '". Most recently, in Hatch v. Davis, this 
Court stated that the appellant's so-called "abuse of process" claim arising out of a civil 
lawsuit for assault and battery was properly termed a claim for "wrongful use of civil 
proceedings" which tort "occurs when a defendant initiates civil proceedings without 
justifiable basis." 2004 UT App. 378,122 n.8, 511 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Oct. 28, 2004) 
(emphasis added); see also Mann v. Wadsworth, 776 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(upholding dismissal of claim against Watkiss & Campbell "for malicious prosecution in 
bringing the [civil] conspiracy suit") (emphasis added). 
In fact, in Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), a case relied 
upon by Lynn here and below, this Court upheld the dismissal of an ex-husband's 
wrongful initiation of civil proceedings claim as a matter of law. In so doing, the Court 
observed that "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has recognized a civil cause of action for 
[wrongful initiation of civil proceedings] where it is shown that a suit was 'brought 
1
 Accord Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 764 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("abuse of 
process" claim based on wrongful initiation of trespass lawsuit); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207, 1216 (Utah 1983) (stating that "a plaintiff who institutes a groundless or 
collusive suit is subject to a suit or counterclaim for abuse of process or malicious 
prosecution"); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308-09 (Utah 1982) 
(forcing a party "to defend two groundless lawsuits . . . . may give rise to independent 
causes of action in tort for abuse of process and malicious prosecution"); Johnson v. Mt. 
Ogden Enters., Inc., 460 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1969) ("malicious prosecution" award 
upheld where "defendant instituted the suit for an injunction without probable cause" and 
"[i]n a majority of the jurisdictions in this country it has been held that an action of 
malicious prosecution will lie for the institution of the civil action maliciously and 
without probable cause."). 
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without probable cause, for the purpose of harassment or annoyance; and it is usually said 
to require malice." Id at 1225 (quoting Baird, 555 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976) (emphasis 
added)). Winters based his wrongful initiation claim on the actions of his ex-wife and her 
attorney in filing a lis pendens on certain of his real property (purchased after the parties' 
divorce) in Utah. Id. at 1220. In a post-divorce enforcement action filed by the ex-wife, 
a California court subsequently ordered the "immediate release" of the lis pendens "after 
hearing Winters's and [his ex-wife's] arguments." Id Ultimately, Winters and his ex-
wife settled the enforcement action with the assistance of the California court. Id. 
Despite the ex-husband's success in having the lis pendens released by the California 
court in the post-divorce enforcement action, and despite finding that the lis pendens 
indeed constituted a wrongful lien under the applicable Utah statute, this Court 
nevertheless upheld the dismissal of Winters' wrongful initiation claim because "Winters 
was not a successful defendant in a prior proceeding." Id. at 1225 (emphasis added). 
Instead, the Court found that Winters was merely "a respondent in a California 
enforcement action that ultimately ended in a settlement between the parties." L± If 
Lynn's construction of the tort of wrongful initiation of civil proceedings — that failed 
arguments (or, to use Judge Hilder's actual description, "novel theories" and "creative 
lawyering" which he did "not wish to discourage") are sufficient to ground the tort — is 
correct, then the filing, recording, and then court-ordered release of a "baseless lien" 
should have been sufficient to ground and salvage Winters's wrongful initiation claim. 
Id at 1220, 1225.2 (R. 114.) 
The Winters case describes plaintiffs cause of action therein as one for "abuse of 
process," but the decision relies on (and quotes from) Baird in reaching its decision 
upholding the claim's dismissal. In Baird, the Utah Supreme Court likewise upheld the 
dismissal of plaintiff s claim for "wrongful bringing of civil proceedings" for failure to 
state a claim. 555 P.2d at 878. Accordingly, the reference in Winters to "abuse of 
process" for a wrongful institution of civil proceedings claim appears to demonstrate the 
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It was not — and for good reason. The tort of wrongful initiation of civil 
proceedings protects against the wrongful initiation of "civil proceedings" — lawsuits — 
not arguments. If Lynn were permitted to state a viable cause of action for the 
advancement of allegedly "meritless theories/' as he contends, then any spouse and any 
lawyer who made an unsuccessful argument in a divorce proceeding automatically would 
face a wrongful initiation of civil proceedings claim. Every divorce action filed in this 
state would have a built-in tort action against the spouse who loses even one argument in 
the battle for the disposition of the couple's property and against that spouse's lawyer. 
Even more broadly, under Lynn's construction of Utah law, every party to every lawsuit 
would face an entirely new lawsuit for each factual assertions or legal arguments the 
finder of fact ultimately rejects. 
For these very reasons, the Utah Supreme Court eloquently rejected the first 
attempt by a Utah litigant to proffer such an argument, nearly eighty years ago: 
Can [the plaintiff] recover damages merely because he was 
sued in a court of justice for more than he actually owed? 
Does it constitute a legal and actionable wrong to sue for 
fact that the wrongful institution tort in Utah historically has been known variously as 
either "abuse of process" or "malicious prosecution." See Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841, 
844 (Utah 1999) ("More commonly, we have addressed [the tort] . . . under the rubric of 
'abuse of process' or 'malicious prosecution.'"). 
Presumably each side will win (and lose) some of the many arguments it will advance 
in any given lawsuit, yielding not just one derivative lawsuit, but multiple lawsuits filed 
by both parties to the underlying action, each claiming that the other (as well as its 
attorneys, experts, paralegals, jury consultants and fact witnesses) conspired to commit 
the tort of "wrongful initiation of civil proceedings" against the other for every argument 
successfully rebutted. Here, for example, although Lynn declines to quote from this 
portion of the Ruling in his complaint, Judge Hilder also "rejected] Lynn's argument that 
a marketability discount of 15% (or any percentage) should be applied to [Foster 
Rentals], because the assets of [Foster Rentals] are readily marketable parcels of 
incoming producing real property." (R. 108.) Under Lynn's construction of the tort, 
Cathie should countersue for the initiation of a wrongful civil proceeding as the result of 
Lynn's assertion of what the divorce court determined was a "meritless" theory, and for 
every other argument he lost in the divorce. 
11 
more than ultimately is found to be due or that is in fact due? 
If that should be held to be a cause of action, suits would 
multiply beyond power of the courts to handle them. 
Karenius v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 235 P. 880, 883 (Utah 1925).4 Losing 
arguments and meritless theories raised in one lawsuit do not, and should not, engender 
new lawsuits for the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings. Instead, in the tort of 
wrongful initiation of civil proceedings, "[t]he references are to a 'proceeding' and in no 
way indicate that any of the theories underlying a particular proceeding could render the 
entire action one without probable cause. [Such an] interpretation . . . would invite a 
multitude of unwarranted litigation arising from situations where a proceeding is 
instituted on the basis of inconsistent theories, or where theories are abandoned during 
the proceeding, and where the proceeding is terminated adversely to the plaintiff." 
Zahorsky v. Griffin, Dysart Taylor, Penner and Lay, P.C., 690 S.W.2d 144, 150-51 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added). Judge Bohling agreed, dismissing Lynn's claim for 
wrongful initiation of civil proceedings with prejudice in part because "the tort applies to 
the wrongful institution of civil proceedings, not arguments, as a matter of law." (R. 453.) 
As Lynn concedes in his brief, sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and other authority exist 
which provide both an adequate remedy and an immediate deterrent for the advancement 
4
 In Karenius, the Merchants' Protective Association ("Merchants") initiated a collection 
action against Karenius for money he conceded that he owed. Merchants expressly 
sought and was successful in entering a default judgment against Karenius for more 
money than was owed. Karenius sued Merchants, claiming that Merchants was liable to 
him for "the wrongful suing out and service of a writ of garnishment" despite the fact that 
the underlying action on which the garnishment was based was proper. 235 P. 882, 883. 
Apparently in recognition of this fact, Karenius disavowed claims for abuse of process or 
malicious prosecution, instead seeking damages arising out of the excess judgment and 
"wrongful" garnishment. Faced with these facts, the Utah Supreme Court unequivocally 
concluded that a claim for more money than is due made in the course of a properly 
initiated lawsuit is not something "for which an action for damages lies": "To go into 
court and collect a past-due claim is a right guaranteed by the Constitution; nor is it made 
a wrong to sue as party for more than is due . . . . " Id at 884. 
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of arguments made in bad faith, and without engendering additional derivative lawsuits 
(which, under Lynn's construction of the tort, could themselves engender still more 
lawsuits, and so on). (Appellant's Br. at 21.) 
In response to this logic, Lynn argues that this Court should hew to the California 
decision of his choosing, Crowley v. Katleman, 881 P.2d 1083 (Cal. 1994). Lynn's 
portrayal of California law and his interpretation of Crowley, however, are both 
incomplete and incorrect. A subsequent California decision, Merlet v. Rizzo, 64 Cal. 
App. 4th 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998), explained Crowley and California law on the tort of 
"malicious prosecution." The Merlet court clarified that, as evidenced by the Crowley 
decision, the California courts "have concluded that subsidiary procedural actions or 
purely defensive actions cannot be the basis for malicious prosecution claims," that 
"ancillary or independent rather than subsidiary proceedings" instead may ground the 
tort, and that a will contest action (such as was at issue in Crowley) in fact constitutes 
such an "ancillary or independent proceeding." 64 Cal. App. 4th at 59, 60-61. The 
reason that a malicious prosecution action cannot be grounded upon actions taken within 
pending litigation, according to the court in Merlet, is "that permitting such a cause of 
action would disrupt the ongoing lawsuit by injecting tort claims against the parties' 
lawyers and because the appropriate remedy for actions taken within a lawsuit lies in the 
invocation of the court's broad powers to control judicial proceedings." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the Merlet court determined (directly contrary to Lynn's assertions here) 
that Crowley "did not hold that merely injecting new facts and legal issues into a 
proceeding and imposing on the party the burden of mounting a defense would be 
sufficient to establish that a proceeding satisfies the requirement of being independent or 
ancillary." 64 Cal. App. 4th at 61 (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Merlet court, 
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California allows malicious prosecution claims to be grounded on independent civil 
proceedings, not on the mere assertion of legal issues and factual matters in any single 
proceeding, even where they impose on the opposing party the burden of mounting a 
defense, such as Lynn objects to here. See id. 
Of course, so long as Lynn would have this Court look to California law in 
creating a claim for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings in this situation, the Court 
should be aware that, based on important policy reasons that are equally evident here, the 
California courts do not allow the tort at all in family law cases. In Green v. Uccelli, for 
example, in explaining its holding that the proper relief for wrongful arguments in 
divorce case was sanctions against the attorney in the divorce, not a separate malicious 
prosecution claim, the court observed that in light of "the deeply personal nature of the 
issues . . . and despite best efforts of the Legislature, the bench and the bar, it is not 
surprising there is still considerable bitterness between spouses whose marriage is being 
dissolved. . . . In this atmosphere, the judge hearing the domestic relations calendar must 
regularly issue orders which do not and most often cannot satisfy either party." 207 Cal. 
App. 3d 1112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In Bidna v. Rosen, the court imposed a bright-line 
rule that malicious prosecution claims do not lie in family law matters because "family 
law cases have a unique propensity for bitterness" and because "allowing separate 
malicious prosecution actions in the wake of unsuccessful attempts to obtain certain 
remedies may have a chilling effect on the ability to obtain those remedies by, in effect, 
increasing the risk of asking for them," among many other reasons. 19 Cal. App. 4th 27, 
35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Most recently, in Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 886 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the California court noted this "abiding judicial reluctance" to 
extend malicious prosecution actions to family law proceedings and held that an ex-
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husband could not sue his ex-wife for malicious prosecution for child sexual molestation 
allegations made in the couple's divorce proceeding for this reason.5 
Cathie's positions in the divorce, however Lynn may chose to articulate them — 
whether as to which or how much of any given asset should be attributed to her or to 
Lynn, how much an asset is worth, or the length, means, or amount of financial support to 
which she is entitled — cannot, and should not, constitute wrongful "proceedings" for 
which Lynn may sue her and her service providers in what is now the third lawsuit 
arising out of the couple's divorce. For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly 
found that Lynn cannot state a claim for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings as a 
matter of law based on the assertion of allegedly "meritless theories" against Cathie, 
much less her lawyer and expert witness, however articulated. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO CORRECTLY DISMISSED LYNN'S CLAIMS 
AGAINST SAUNDERS BECAUSE THEY ARE BARRED BY THE 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE. 
A. The Judicial Proceedings Privilege Bars Lynn's Slander of Title 
Claims As a Matter of Law. 
Utah law is clear that three elements must be satisfied in order to invoke the 
"absolute immunity" provided by the judicial proceedings privilege: 
First, the statement must have been made during or in the 
course of a judicial proceeding. Second, the statement must 
have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding. 
Finally, the one claiming the privilege must have been acting 
in the capacity of a judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel 
in the proceeding . . . . 
Notably, these courts also support the decision not to allow the maintenance of 
malicious prosecution claims in the family law context with the numerous California 
cases holding that meritless positions in lawsuits "do not constitute a separate proceeding 
upon which an action for malicious prosecution can be premised." Begier, 46 Cal. App. 
4th at 886 n.8 (collecting cases). 
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Ortez, 802 P.2d at 1312 n.8. Under the privilege, "statements of attorneys, parties, 
judges, witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process enjoy an absolute 
privilege against liability for torts if the statements are made during or preliminary to a 
judicial proceeding." Bower v. Stein Eriksen Lodge Owners Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d 
1134, 1138 (D. Utah 2002) (emphasis added). The historic privilege is "absolute" 
because it serves the important public policy of "securing to attorneys as officers of the 
court the utmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients." Beezley v. 
Hansen, 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1955) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 586). All but 
two states recognize the privilege and its provision of "absolute immunity for lawyers 
involved in litigation[,] with very little variation from state to state." T. Leigh Anenson, 
Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 915, 918 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Lynn concedes, as he must, that Saunders and the other defendants have "clearly 
established" the first and third elements of the three-pronged test, and that, were the 
privilege to apply, his slander of title claims against Saunders are properly dismissed. 
(Appellant's Br. at 26-27; R. 132, 152.) Lynn's sole argument as to why the judicial 
proceedings privilege does not bar his slander of title claims outright is that Cathie's 
affidavit — filed in the couple's divorce and stating that she "and/or Lynn" held 
ownership interests in a variety of properties, which interests the divorce court then 
adjudicated and apportioned — somehow does not have "some reference" to the subject 
matter of the couple's divorce. (R. 132.) Simply on its face, this argument lacks any 
credibility. As the trial court correctly determined below, and as this Court is well aware, 
marshalling and dividing a couple's property is necessarily the subject matter of divorce, 
and Lynn's assigned slander of title claims against Saunders are correctly dismissed as 
barred by the privilege. 
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In addition to Lynn's claim that Cathie's affidavit does not bear even "some 
reference" to the Foster's divorce, Lynn also argues that this Court can look no further 
than the "four corners of the amended complaint" in assessing the privilege, and that the 
Court must blind itself to the portions of the Ruling he declines to quote in his complaint, 
on which his claims unquestionably are based. (See Appellant's Br. at 28). As set forth 
in detail below, Judge Bohling considered and correctly rejected both arguments. 
Lynn bases his argument that Cathie's statement does not have "some reference" 
to the subject matter of the divorce solely on his interpretation of Wright v. Lawson, 530 
P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1975). Lynn argues that because the Wright court observes that 
"[t]he majority of American courts have adopted the rule that there is no immunity unless 
particular statements are in some way 'relevant' or 'pertinent' to some issue in the case," 
Cathie's statement that she "and/or" Lynn held ownership interests in various properties 
cannot qualify as having "some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding." 
(Appellant's Br. at 27). First, and as discussed above, Cathie's affidavit clearly passes 
the mere "relevant or pertinent to some issue in the case" standard set forth in Wright, 
which Lynn contends is applicable. At issue in the Foster's divorce, as in every divorce, 
was the adjudication and equitable division of the couple's interests in property, in 
whatever form such interests may exist. If this principle requires support, this Court need 
look no further than the numerous decisions on appeal considering the decisions of 
Utah's district courts doing exactly that. See Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 
(Utah 1987) (noting that the supreme court has "consistently concluded that [the divorce 
statute] confer[s] broad discretion on trial courts in the division of property, regardless of 
its source or time of acquisition."); Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930, 931 (Utah 1962) 
(holding that property quit-claimed by husband to his attorney was "within the 
jurisdiction of the court [in the divorce action,] having been thus committed to it for the 
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purpose of adjudication" in the divorce). Cathie's affidavit was necessarily part of her 
effort to have the court adjudicate the marital estate, and it is for this very reason that 
Lynn sues her and her lawyer here. Indeed, the divorce court's ruling expressly found 
that Cathie held a one-half interest in 92% of Foster Rentals, which entity held title to 
numerous of the eleven properties listed in Cathie's affidavit, that another of the eleven 
properties was a "joint asset" of the marriage and the couple's former residence, and 
concluded that Lynn (in his capacity as manager of Foster Rentals) must remain 
"accountable to [Cathie] as a significant owner, along with the other members of the 
LLC, until her interest [in the LLC] is satisfied." (R. 104, 107, 109.) Therefore, the 
statements upon which Lynn would base his claim for slander of title easily meet the 
standard of mere "pertinence" or "relevance" set forth in Wright.6 
Second, in a case decided fifteen years after Wright (but which Lynn declines to 
cite in his brief), the Utah Supreme Court explained that 
The Restatement provides that the testimony need not be 
material or even relevant so long as it has "some reference to 
the subject of the litigation." Most courts hold that the 
defamatory material need not be relevant as an evidentiary 
matter, but need only have "some relation" to the proceeding. 
Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1312 n.8 (Utah 1990) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court then concluded that "[w]e read 
this court's language in Wright v. Lawson . . . as implying, if not expressing, the same 
meaning." Id. (emphasis added). 
Subsequent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court interpreting the "some 
reference" requirement of the judicial proceeding privilege are in accord with Ortez. In 
fact, in Debry v. Godbe, the supreme court cited Wright for the proposition that "[a] 
6
 Indeed, the relevance standard is met by the fact of the statements' admission into 
evidence in the divorce. (R. 107-110.) 
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statement need not be relevant or pertinent to the judicial proceeding from an evidentiary 
point of view for the privilege to apply. The requirement is that a statement have 'some 
relationship to the cause or subject matter involved."5 992 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah 1999) 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, "because of the important purpose the privilege serves," 
the Debry court advised that "[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of the statement 
having reference to the subject matter of the proceeding." Id. (emphasis added); see also 
Krouse v. Bower. 20 P.3d 895, 899 (Utah 2001) ("The rule enunciated in Wright is thus 
congruent with the second element of the test set forth in Ortez, that the allegedly 
defamatory statements 'have some reference to the subject matter of the proceeding.'"). 
Lynn's arguments that this Court is required to ignore what the remainder of the 
Ruling (on which he bases his claims and from which he quotes, albeit selectively, in his 
complaint) makes clear, and that the Court is obligated to "infer" that facts exist that 
show that Cathie's statement, despite being actually adjudicated in the divorce, 
nevertheless had no reference to the divorce, are equally incorrect. (Appellant's Br. at 
28.) 
First, these assertions directly contradict well-established law that documents 
"referred to" in a plaintiffs complaint and which are central to a plaintiffs claim "may 
be considered on a motion to dismiss." GFF Corp. v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 
130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997); Nester v. Bank One Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 
1345-46 (D. Utah 2002) (same); see a]so 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1327, at 762-63 ("[W]hen a plaintiff fails to introduce a pertinent 
document as part of his pleading, defendant may introduce the exhibit as part of his 
motion attacking the pleading."). According to the Utah Supreme Court, the reason for 
this is that otherwise, "a plaintiff with a deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss 
simply by not attaching a dispositive document upon which the plaintiff relied." 
19 
Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^ 13 (Utah 2004) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Judge Hilder's Ruling, no less than the affidavit 
submitted by Cathie, is not only "central" to Lynn's claims, it forms the basis for his 
entire complaint, and not least because Lynn directly quoted portions of it therein. (Am. 
Compl. f 11; R. 19-20.) Indeed, Lynn again quotes portions of the Ruling to make his 
case on appeal, even as he claims that examination of the remainder of the Ruling is 
impermissible. (Appellant's Br. at 4, 9.) 
Second, in Utah, as elsewhere, "[t]he determination of whether the communication 
has sufficient reference to the subject matter of the litigation is a question of law." Ortez, 
802 P.2d at 1312 n.8; Krouse, 20 P.3d at 897 (upholding dismissal pursuant to the 
judicial proceedings privilege on Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Because Cathie's statements in 
her affidavit easily bear "some relation" to the divorce proceedings as evidenced by 
documents quoted in and central to Lynn's claims, the trial court appropriately dismissed 
the slander of title claims. Of course, even if this were a close case, which it is not, 
"[d]oubts should be resolved in favor of the statement having reference to the subject 
matter of the proceeding." Debry, 992 P.2d at 984. 
B. The Judicial Proceedings Privilege Also Bars Lynn's Wrongful 
Initiation of Civil Proceedings Claim As Pled. 
Lynn's claim for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings also is barred by the 
judicial proceedings privilege. As discussed in detail above, the doctrine provides that 
"an attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of 
another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the 
institution of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he 
participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto." Beezley v. Hansen, 286 P.2d 
1057, 1058 (Utah 1955) (quoting Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3, § 586). Contrary to 
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Lynn's arguments on appeal, Saunders never argued, and the trial court did not conclude, 
that the privilege bars all claims for wrongful initiation of civil proceedings, only that the 
privilege bars Lynn's construction of the claim here. (R. 194-97.) Significantly, despite 
his status as the only other litigant to the Fosters' divorce, the sole "meritless theory" 
alleged by Lynn in his complaint is the filing of Cathie's allegedly slanderous affidavit. 
(Am. Compl. fflf 12-16, 21-28; R. 20, 22-23.) Under the privilege, as set forth above, 
attorneys are "absolutely" privileged to publish false material in the course of judicial 
proceedings, so long as the statement bears "some relation" to the subject matter of the 
proceedings. See, e^g., Ortez, 802 P.2d at 1312 n.8; Beezley, 286 P.2d at 1058. Lynn's 
wrongful initiation claim is barred by the privilege just as his slander of title claims are 
barred by the privilege. 
Because the privilege bars his claims as a matter of law, Lynn now suggests that 
the Court must assume that all manner of other "meritless" (but non-defamatory) theories 
also were advanced in the divorce sufficient to breathe life into his wrongful initiation 
claim. For the reasons set forth in Part I, however, any meritless theory Lynn might 
articulate will not constitute the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings as a matter of 
law. Lynn's wrongful initiation claim, as pled, clearly derives from an alleged slander, 
and is therefore barred. As set forth above, any other "meritless theory" he might attempt 
to articulate instead will not constitute the wrongful initiation of civil proceedings as a 
matter of law, rendering the privilege unnecessary. 
n 
Indeed, Silver v. Mendel cited by Lynn for the proposition that the judicial 
proceedings privilege should not bar a proper cause of action for the wrongful initiation 
of civil proceedings, makes that point with particular clarity. There, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, like every Utah court to have considered the cause of action, concluded 
that "imposition of liability for the wrongful use of civil proceedings occurs only when 
litigation is instituted both without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than 
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are based." 
894 F.2d 598, 603-04 (3d Cir. 1990) (last emphasis in original). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO CORRECTLY DISMISSED THE SLANDER OF 
TITLE CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF 
CLAIM PRECLUSION. 
Even if Lynn's claims were not barred by the judicial proceedings privilege, the 
trial court also correctly dismissed them because they are barred by the doctrine of claim 
preclusion. Lynn makes only two arguments against this result on appeal, both incorrect. 
First, he repeats his argument that application of the doctrine requires "assess[ment] [of] 
facts outside of those pleaded in the Amended Complaint," Appellant's Brief at 32, 
which fails for the reasons set forth in the previous section. Second, Lynn misstates the 
doctrine of claim preclusion entirely, arguing that it should not apply because the 
judgments obtained by Lynn's assignors, Foster Rentals and Foster Family, in the first 
two lawsuits on these facts do not expressly "release" Saunders who was "not [a] part[y] 
to the quiet title actions." (Appellant's Br. at 33.) Lynn's unsupported assertion that 
claim preclusion requires a contractual "release" of the precise defendant who must later 
assert the doctrine directly contradicts Utah law and stands claim preclusion — and its 
policy of discouraging seriatim litigation and of promoting judicial repose — on its head. 
Office of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (claim 
preclusion protects "vital public interests including (1) fostering reliance on prior 
adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) conserving judicial resources."). 
As the Court is aware, claim preclusion will bar a cause of action if "three 
requirements" are met: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must 
have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could 
and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first 
suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
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Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). For claim preclusion to apply, the 
two cases need not involve identical parties, as Lynn contends. (Appellant's Br. at 33.) 
Instead, the two cases must involve the same parties "or their privies." Madsen, 769 P.2d 
at 247. Utah law is clear that claim preclusion not only bars a second lawsuit by the same 
plaintiff against the same defendant, as Lynn urges, but also bars "subsequent litigation 
concerning the same subject matter against. . . agents, alter egos or other parties with 
similar legal interests." Press Publ'g, Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Internat'l Ltd., 37 P.3d 
1121, 1128 (Utah 2001) (emphasis added). Moreover, "[gjenerally, an employer-
employee or agent-principal relationship," such as existed between Saunders and Cathie 
in the divorce, "will provide the necessary privity for claim preclusion with respect to 
matters within the scope of the relationship, no matter which party is first sued." 18 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 131.40[3][f] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.) The trial court 
correctly held that claim preclusion is established here. 
Lynn claims to have received his slander of title against Saunders by assignment 
from the Foster L.L.C.s. (Am. Compl. ffif 1, 32, 34; R. 17, 24.)9 Those entities obtained 
final judgments in the two actions against Cathie, which suits also were based on the 
statements made in her affidavit in the divorce action. (Am. Compl. ^ 17, 30, 34; R. 21, 
23, 24.) Lynn's complaint alleges that Foster Rentals obtained a "judgment and decree 
quieting title" against Cathie on July 30, 2001, and seeks to recover both Foster Rentals' 
o 
By his failure to offer any argument on the point, Lynn concedes that Saunders has 
established these elements. American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., 930 P.2d 
1182, 1185 n.5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived and 
abandoned."). 
Under Utah law, which Lynn again declines to refute, an "assignee is subject to any 
defenses that would have been good against the [assignor]; the assignee cannot recovei 
more than the assignor could recover; and the assignee never stands in a better position 
than the assignor." SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett Stainback and Assocs., 
Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 676 (Utah 2001). 
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and Foster Family's "attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in clearing title" in 
those actions. (Id.) Lynn's complaint also alleges that Saunders' liability in this action 
arises out of her actions as Cathie's attorney and "agent" during the divorce. (Am. 
Compl. at 1f1 7, 20; R. 18,21.). 
Accordingly, because Lynn's assignors obtained final judgments against Cathie, 
Saunders' principal, in two previous lawsuits, because those lawsuits also arose out of the 
statement in Cathie's affidavit, and because those lawsuits involved the same parties, 
their privies or their assignors, Lynn's slander of title claims also were correctly 
dismissed for the independent reason that they are barred by the doctrine of claim 
preclusion. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The trial court also properly dismissed Lynn's slander of title claims because they 
were untimely as a matter of law under the one year statute of limitations applicable to 
claims for libel and slander. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4). For this reason, Lynn 
attempts to convince the Court that the three year limitation period for injury to real 
property set forth at Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-26(1) should govern instead. 
(Appellant's Br. at 31.) The issue of which statute of limitations applies to slander of title 
claims is one of first impression in Utah. However, in the absence of a specific statute 
setting out a limitations period specifically for claims for slander of title, the 
overwhelming majority of American courts hold that the limitations period for slander 
and libel applies. 
"[I]n the absence of a statute expressly referring to actions for slander of title, the 
statute of limitations applicable to actions for libel and slander applies to actions for 
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slander of title." Bonner v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 487 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1992); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 564 (1995) (same). Moreover, 
"[t]he majority of the courts that have considered the issue have held that the statute of 
limitations for libel governs actions for slander of title"; there is "no reason to vary the 
statute of limitations because property rather than a person is defamed." Gee v. Pima 
County, 612 P.2d 1079, 1080 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Hosev v. Central Bank of 
Birmingham, Inc., 528 So.2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1988) (adopting the "great weight of 
authority in this Country . . . that the Statute of Limitations applicable to libel and slander 
is equally applicable to actions for slander of title"); Norton v. Kanouff, 86 N.W.2d 72, 
74-77 (Neb. 1957) (relying on a survey of case law nationwide to conclude that an action 
for slander of title is governed by the one year statute of limitations applicable to libel 
and slander).10 Because Utah has not enacted a statute of limitation for slander of title 
1U
 Macia v. Microsoft Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 535, 541 (D. Vt. 2001) (holding that 
slander and libel limitations period applies to actions for slander of title); Scott Paper Co. 
v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 343 F. Supp. 229, 235 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that libel and 
slander limitation period expressly covers actions for disparagement of property or trade 
libel); Lehigh Chemical Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 278 F. Supp. 894, 897-98 (D. 
Md. 1968) (limitation period for actions for libel and slander applicable to slander of title 
claims); Carroll v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 20 F. Supp. 405, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (same); 
LaBarge v. City of Concordia, 927 P.2d 487, 493 (Kan Ct. App. 1996) (adopting "the 
majority view" and barring plaintiffs slander of title action under the statute of 
limitations relative to actions for libel and slander); Montgomery v. Milam, 910 S.W.2d 
237, 240 (Ky. 1995) (same); Hanbidge v. Hunt, 183 A.D.2d 700, 701 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992) (holding that slander of title actions are governed by the one-year statute of 
limitation applicable to general slander actions); Hosey v. Central Bank of Birmingham, 
Inc., 528 So.2d 843, 844 (Ala. 1988) (adopting the "great weight of authority in this 
Country . . . that the Statute of Limitations applicable to libel and slander is equally 
applicable to actions for slander of title"); Gee v. Pima County, 612 P.2d 1079, 1080 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that "the majority of the courts that have considered the 
issue have held that the statute of limitations for libel governs actions for slander of title" 
and seeing "no reason to vary the statute of limitations because property rather than a 
person is defamed"); Gentry v. State, 118 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Neb. 1962) (same); Norton 
v. Kanouff, 86 N.W.2d 72, 74-76 (Neb. 1957) (same); Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule 
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actions specifically, the trial court correctly applied the one year limitation period set 
forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4), and held that both of Lynn's claims for slander of 
title here are time barred.11 
Rather than distinguishing what is overwhelmingly the majority rule, Lynn urges 
this Court to follow one case, Howard v. Hudson, a federal decision concluding that, 
under California law, the statute of limitations for injury to real property should apply to 
slander of title actions. 259 F.2d 29, 32 (9th Cir. 1958). Lynn argues, as he did below, 
that because the Utah Supreme Court in dicta distinguished aspects of the tort of slander 
from that of slander of title in Bass v. Planned Management Servs., Inc., 761 P.2d 566 
(Utah 1988), Utah courts are therefore obligated to apply the statute of limitation for 
injury to real property. The trial court correctly rejected this claim for two reasons. 
First, Lynn's argument utterly fails to acknowledge the fact that, nearly a decade 
after Bass, the Utah Supreme Court expressly declared that "[t]his court has never 
addressed the requirements to trigger the running of the statute of limitations in a slander 
of title action." Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 
1997). More than merely leaving the issue open, however, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Valley Colour expressly declined to decide "whether . . . a slander of title claim involves 
Industries, Inc., 68 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1953) (same); Buehrer v. Provident Mut. Life 
Ins. Co., 175 N.E. 25, 27 (Ohio 1931) (same); Bush v. McMann, 55 P. 956, 957 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1899) (same); see also 50 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 564 (1995) ("In 
the absence of a statute expressly referring to actions for slander of title, the statute of 
limitations applicable to actions for libel and slander applies to actions for slander of 
title."). 
11
 Lynn filed his complaint on January 31, 2003, and conceded below that the slander of 
title claims accrued on May 3 and July 30, 2001, respectively. (R. 30-43, 136-37.) 
Accordingly, the only issue here is one of law — which statute of limitations properly 
applies to the slander of title claims. As such, the trial court correctly followed the clear 
majority rule, applied the one-year statute, and determined that the slander of title claims 
were required to have been filed on or before May 3 and July 30, 2002, and were 
therefore untimely. 
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injury to person or property for another day," 944 P.2d at 364, the very proposition which 
Lynn urges is "clear" from Bass, and which (he claims) argues in favor of application of 
the statute of limitation for injury to property. Id. at 364. (Appellant's Br. at 31.) 
Accordingly, no Utah law exists providing that Utah would (or should) apply the 
limitation period for property claims. 
Second, as set forth above, courts from coast to coast consistently reject just the 
approach urged by Lynn. In Buehrer v. Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co., for 
example, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs argument that the limitations period 
for actions for injury or trespass to real property controlled its slander of title claim. The 
court reasoned that 
[the libel and slander] section comprehends all actions for 
slander or for libel, and is not limited, in terms, to slander or 
libel against the person only; nor is it confined to any 
particular kind of slander — slander of the person rather than 
of property; nor can we see any legislative purpose in making 
such a distinction. 
175 N.E. 25, 27 (Ohio 1931). Likewise, in Lehigh Chemical Co. v. Celanese Corp. of 
America, the court rejected an argument that the injury to property limitations period 
should apply, concluding that "the one-year period of limitations for all actions on the 
case for libel and slander is applicable not only to actions for personal defamation but 
also for actions charging disparagement of property." 278 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D. Md. 
1968); see also Bonner. 487 N.W.2d at 812 (finding "no reason to make a distinction 
between an action alleging defamation of title to property and an action alleging 
defamation of the person"). 
In light of the great weight of authority applying the slander and libel limitations 
period to slander of title claims even when presented with a limitation period for injury to 
real property, this Court should reject Lynn's appeal for the latter. As courts nationwide 
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have done, unless and until the Utah Legislature enacts a specific statute of limitations 
governing slander of title, this Court should apply the one year period applicable to 
slander claims set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(4), and affirm their dismissal on 
this additional ground. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's dismissal 
with prejudice of Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn G. Foster's amended complaint. 
DATED this J V ^ day of December, 2004. 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Amy F. Sorenson 
Nathan E. Wheatley 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UT^H 
F I L E D 
DEC 2 # 2MJ 
CATHIE FOSTER, By T h i r d Strict Court g . 
Petitioner, RULING 
vs. 
LYNN G. FOSTER, 
Case No, 004600010 
Respondent 
Judge Robert K.Hilder 
This matter was tried to the court on September 10, 11, 13 and 14, 2001, and closing 
argument was heard on September 28, 2001, after which the matter was taken under advisement. 
Respondent (for clarity, the court will hereafter frequently refer to the parties by their first 
names: petitioner as "Cathie" and respondent as "Lynn") filed a post trial affidavit on November 
30, 2001, regarding an alleged change in economic circumstances. Petitioner opposed receipt of 
the affidavit, and respondent filed a reply. The court has reviewed the affidavit and memoranda, 
and concludes that the affidavit will not be a factor in the decision, The affidavit suffices to 
show that Lynn's employment circumstances have changed, but it does not adequately establish 
his reasonable earning prospects and is; therefore, not a better alternative than the evidence 
adduced at trial to allow the court to reach a reasonable determination regarding his income from 
professional employment, hi addition, if the affidavit did lay a sufficient evidentiary basis to 
require the court to reconsider the evidence regarding professional income, then it would be 
necessary to reopen the case to allow rebuttal evidence from petitioner. Under the 
circumstances, that is neither appropriate nor necessary. 
This Ruling is intended to include all essential findings and conclusions, but it does not 
purport to be formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Accordingly, the court requests 
counsel for respondent, Ms. Maycock, to prepare formal Findings and Conclusions, and a 
Decree of Divorce, consistent with this Ruling, but also including any necessary findings and . 
conclusions that the court might have inadvertently omitted. 
Child custody was settled in a prior hearing, with each parent awarded custody of one of 
the two minor sons. The parties were married September 20, 1979, and separated January, 2000. 
At the time of separation and of filing the parties were resident in Summit County, and had been 
for more than three months. Petitioner alleges irreconcilable differences, and those grounds were 
clearly established at trial. The court has determined, and the parties appear to agree, that with 
the possibility of some minor exceptions, property in this case shall be valued and divided as of 
September 14,2001. 
Provo Rental House 
The court finds that net income from the Provo house is a joint asset. Lynn should be 
ordered to provide an accounting for all rental income derived from that rental from the date of 
separation. Allowable expenses are taxes, insurance, maintenance and any costs of renting the 
property, but only expenses related to that specific property. The resulting net amount is 
awarded equally, and Lynn must pay Cathie's share within sixty days of entry of the final Decree 
in this matter. 
With respect to the Provo house, Lynn asserts that it is a valuable asset and that it is 
marketable. Nevertheless, he strongly urges that the house should be awarded to Cathie at the 
appraised value of $305,000. Cathie does not want the house. She prefers to relocate to Summit 
County and she doubts the marketability of the Provo house. The court finds that the house 
should be sold, with proceeds net of sale costs and the Anna Martin loan principal, divided 
equally (if there is interest on the Anna Martin loan, Lynn shall be entirely responsible). Lynn 
shall be responsible to market the home in a commercially reasonable manner. Based on his 
testimony regarding value and marketability, if the house sells for more than ten percent less than 
the appraised value, Cathie's proceeds shall nevertheless not be less than half of ninety percent of 
the appraised value, less her actual half share of sale costs and Anna Martin loan principal. Lynn 
may wish to assign his share of the net proceeds to Cathie in partial settlement of her interest in 
Foster Rentals. 
Foster Family Properties (law office and related buildings) 
It is undisputed that Cathie owns no interest in the law practices, as such, but there is an 
issue regarding the properties associated with the practice, and possibly the few assets of the LC 
that was dissolved after Lynn's 1998 illness, including any residual accounts receivable. The 
court determines that the real property associated with the practices, located at approximately 
300 South and 600 East in Salt Lake City, were Lynn's premarital property. They remained his 
property after marriage, and minimal if any activity occurred after marriage that would convert 
th^ property into a marital asset. 
Cathie argues that Lynn's excessive work at the practice constituted investment of a 
marital asset, and in addition, or alternatively, she argues the "partnership of marriage" theory set 
forth in Dunn v Dunn. Lynn did work hard at the practice and Cathie bore a disproportionate 
share of the responsibilities in the home, thus giving Lynn the freedom to devote his time to 
building both the law practice and the rental properties, but even if that contribution sufficed to 
grant CaUue a marital interest in the law practice, or more relevantly, the buildings, that interest 
was voluntarily and consensually transferred over time, for value in cash, services, and the less 
tangible benefit of time, to Lynn's sons, Brett and Grant 
The evidence is unassailable that the decision to invite first Brett, then Grant, to join the 
practice, was joint. It is also unrefuted that Brett and Grant were well situated professionally and 
would not have made the moves without promises that they would ultimately receive the assets 
associated with the practice, and even specifically that they would not have come without 
assurances that Cathie would not, at some point, claim an interest in the practices or assets. They 
had that assurance, and Cathie was part of it. The transfer of assets was not designed to take 
assets from Cathie in contemplation of divorce, and the transfer commenced before either Lynn's 
illness or any concrete decisions by either party to divorce. It is true that the transfer was 
accelerated after Lynn's illness, but that was a sound business decision that merely implemented 
a longer term plan, and did so sooner rather than later in recognition of Lynn's precarious health 
and his relatively advanced age. The court finds that all properties included in the entity Foster 
Family Properties belong to Brett Foster and Grant Foster, free of any interest in Cathie Foster. 
One final issue regarding the law practice is Cathie's suggestion that the receivables and 
the personal property associated with the practice were transferred for less than value, thus 
depriving the marital estate of a valuable asset. The court finds, however, that there is no 
evidence to support such a finding. The personal property was sold, along with remaining 
receivables There was no substantial or detailed evidence regarding the personal property, and 
the evidence regarding the receivables was that they were not sold until they were substantially 
aged (in fact, some were undoubtedly aged before the post-illness collection efforts commenced, 
after which more than another year passed before sale), and after all reasonable collection efforts 
were concluded, In addition, the amounts actually collected after transfer were very consistent 
with the value assigned. 
Foster Rentals 
Lynn accumulated and managed certain rental properties before the marriage, and 
continued to do so after the marriage. When the various properties were brought together within 
the Foster Rentals entity, for both management and estate planning purposes, they comprised the 
parties' biggest asset. Cathie argues that because of commingling within Foster Rentals, as well 
as use of the family asset of both Lynn and Cathie's efforts, and Lynn's marital income (derived 
in part from his long hours and limited contributions in the home), Lynn and Cathie's 92% 
interest in Foster Rentals, in its entirety, is a marital asset, Cathie appears to agree that the eight 
percent of Foster Rentals previously conveyed to certain Foster children is neither her asset nor 
Lynn's, 
Lynn agrees that certain of the assets arc marital property, but argues that others, which 
were acquired before the marriage, were self-sustaining during the marriage, with no substantial 
contribution from Cathie or from marital assets, or that they at least include a premarital portion 
that should be awarded to him. Both are correct in some respects: 
The Duchesne Lots include premarital property which shall not be included in the Foster 
Rental value to be divided (value $72,422), Similarly, the Hill view and Lincoln Arms 
receivables, assets derived from premarital purchase and sale of real property, are Lynn's sole 
property, which assets were rolled into Foster Rentals and should be carved out as his sole 
property, in the amounts of $150,000 and $22,000 respectively. 
The court finds that the Lehi houses include a substantial premarital interest, but that 
Cathie should be allowed a marital asset credit of $20,000 (resulting in a credit to her personally 
of $10,000 in the ultimate disposition of marital assets), based on completion of the log home 
during the marriage and Cathie's assistance with some of the work. This will be accomplished 
by valuing Lynn's premarital interest at $141,199, or $20,000 less than the amount he claims. 
The court cannot determine from the evidence that the $60,000 related to 625 Northcrest 
maintained its separate status nor can it say that Royal Crest (6lh Avenue Apartments) maintained 
its separate identity sufficiently to maintain its premarital character, and exercising its equitable 
discretion, the court further finds that Cathie's contribution to the partnership of marriage in her 
maintenance of the home and her actions that facilitated Lynn's dedication to th* family's 
business interests should be accounted for; accordingly, neither olairnfwill be recognized. 
The court finds the value of Foster Rentals to be as determined in the initial appraisals. 
Specifically, the court rejects the revised appraisal for the K Street Apartments, because the 
reasons therefor were not persuasive and were not supported by concrete evidence. The court 
accepts the debt figures as respondent's experts proffered, but instructs that any debt reduction 
since approximately September 10, 2001, be factored in to any final accounting. The court 
rejects Lymfs argument that a marketability discount of 15% (or any percentage) should be 
applied to the LLC, because the assets of this LLC are readily marketable parcels of income 
producing real property. The LLC may not wish to liquidate, but if it must the value is clearly 
present 
The court is assuming a value net of mortgage debt, and prefers to use a value net of both 
sales commissions and capital gains taxes, but the parties may have some flexibility in the 
ultimate disposition, That is, Lynn may either transfer funds or property at gross values, leaving 
Cathie to handle her own real estate commission and capital gains issues, or he may elect to find 
.some way to transfer funds or property to Cathie that will result in her receiving the net amount 
to which she is entitled after commissions and taxes. In any event, the court finds that Cathie 
shall receive half of the marital interesi (that is, half of 92% of the net value of Foster Rentals). 
Because the figures may change, the court will not do the actual calculation, but Cathie shall 
receive either of the following, potentially adjusted for changes in debt or actual tax calculations: 
the gross value (deducting mortgage debt only) of $2,351,322, less Lynn's premarital interest in 
the amount of $385,621, multiplied by 46% (that is, half of the resulting marital interest); or net 
value of $1,694,613, less Lynn's premarital interest in the amount of $385,621, multiplied by 
46%, but if the latter option is chosen, the resulting amount must be net to Cathie. Both options 
use a value that requires Lynn to repay his loans from Foster Rentals, and also include a cash 
balance of $7,540. 
Lyim shall continue his management of Foster Rentals, but he shall be accountable to 
Cathie as a significant owner, along with the other members of the LLC, until her interest is 
satisfied. 
Finally, with respect to Foster Rentals, the court absolutely rejects petitioner's argument 
regarding improper use of Foster Rentals assets in the past two years. Lynn's salary was 
reasonable, the payments on the Pinebrook condominium merely reduced debt on the a Foster 
Rentals marital asset, and the evidence was unpersuasive that any other expenses were not 
justified and reasonable. The court notes at this point that Cathie makes a number of allegations 
regarding misuse or concealment of additional funds, but her testimony is either speculative or 
lacking credibility on these issues. Cathie claims that information was concealed from her, but 
the court finds that information was generally available, and sometimes affirmatively provided, 
but Cathie chose to stay uninformed in most cases. She should not now be allowed to benefit 
from her own choice to ignore opportunities to be better informed, 
Retirement Account (SEP) 
The SEP retirement account is a joint asset, which shall be assigned to Cathie and fifty 
percent of the value shall offset her interest in Foster Rentals. That asset will be assigned at its 
value net of taxes ($107,061) if Cathie is compensated in net funds, or full value ($178,435) if 
the division is accomplished in gross terms 
Child Support 
The parties each have custody of one minor son. Based on the income figures found by 
the court in the alimony section of this Ruling, Lynn would have a support obligation under the 
tables in the approximate amount of $300.00. At trial Lynn stipulated that he would pay $700.00 
per month for the younger son, which is about two times the required sum, unless the court finds 
reason to further substantially depart from the tables. The court can find no basis for such a 
departure In view of the overall asset allocation, Cathie's earning ability and reasonable need, 
the alimony award, and the absence of any compelling argument that the child's needs are 
extraordinary and unmet when the court considers the totality of the circumstances, the court 
can find no basis to exceed the tables beyond the amount already offered by respondent. 
Accordingly, Lynn should be ordered to pay Cathie child support in the amount of $700.00, 
which is a continuation of the existing order. 
Alimony 
Cathie asserts a justified alimony request in this marriage of over twenty years, where 
Lynn was primary earner, and the parties assumed traditional roles. One problem with Cathie\s 
request, however, is her strongly urged position that Lynn is capable of and morally bound to 
work well into his seventies at the same level of productivity he displayed during the prime of his 
professional working lite, and that he should do this despite the substantial impact of his near 
fatal illness and the predictable, indeed almost inevitable, decline in his practice. This claim 
ignores physical, professional and economic realilies that were all clearly established by Lynn 
His energy has declined, his mental acuity somewhat diminished (although he is still clearly a 
very able man intellectually), and his practice has shrunk. He will never return to his prior 
productivity, and even before the illness and the imminence of divorce Lynn was contemplating 
retirement and a reduced income. 
The other problems with Cathie's very substantial alimony claim are that she claims 
expenses that far exceed the whole family's living expenses before separation, and she claims 
that because she is fifty years old, and has one teenager at home, she should not be required to 
work a full time job. Both the expense and the earning capacity arguments are untenable. Cathie 
has spent more than a year preparing to re-enter the nursing profession, an area in which she was 
apparently quite successful before marriage, and equally successful, albeit on a part time basis, 
during some periods after marriage. The court finds the evidence persuasive that Cathie should 
be licensed again within a very short time, and that she should be able to earn at least $12.00 per 
hour on a full time basis, resulting in earned income exceeding $2,000 per month initially, which 
income will reasonably increase as Cathie gains experience, to at least $2,800 per month in 
current dollars. 
Regarding expenses, the court makes adjustments in the following areas: mortgage 
(Cathie will receive substantial assets, from which she will either be able to avoid a mortgage 
entirely, or conversely invest the amounts received and obtain additional income), medical 
insurance (the claimed sum is high assuming Cathie obtains full time employment, with even 
average benefits), automobile, vacations, gifts, tithing and taxes. Total reductions approximate 
$3,200, leaving expenses of about $57500 with a child at home, $4 t600 thereafter. Using the first 
figure, after deducting Cathie's earning ability, and child support in the amount of $700 per 
month., her need is about $2,800, but except for the mortgage adjustment herein, this need 
ignores the fact that Cathie will receive about $700,000 in the ultimate disposition of marital 
assets. In this case, where Lynn must use his share of assets as a primary source of income, 
equity requires that both parties realize the income potential from his or her share of assets, and 
that the income to be derived be accounted for in a support award. 
The final factor is Lynn's earning ability. The court finds that his recent history of about 
$50,000 in taxable income from the law practice is reasonable, Lynn may exceed that yearly sum 
by a small amount, but there is no evidence to suggest that he can do so consistently, or even for 
many more years. Since separation Lynn has been taking a salary, in the amount of $3,000 per 
month, from Foster Rentals. The sum is reasonable, but it is difficult to say whether he will be 
able to justify that salary, or otherwise realize comparable income form the rental properties after 
he satisfies Cathie's interests as awarded herein. Lynn also receives social security income, for a 
monthly total income of about $8,500 to $9,000. His reasonable expenses, before alimony and 
child support, are in the range of $4,500, including taxes. 
Based on the foregoing, Lynn shall pay alimony effective January 1, 2002, in the amount 
of $2,000 per month, for twenty four months, then $1,750 per month for twenty four months, 
after which alimony will reduce to $ 1,500 per month, Alimony shall continue for the duration of 
the marriage, or until the remarriage or cohabitation of petitioner, or the death of either party. 
Income Tax Return (2000) 
Cathie should not have filed a separate year 2000 income tax return. The parties should 
be ordered to amend their 2000 returns to file a joint return which shall among other things, 
account for the lax prepayment from marital funds that occurred near the time of separation A 
refund is contemplated, and shall be shared equally If there is no refund, Lynn, as manager of 
family and business finances before separation, shall bear the sole liability. 
Miscellaneous 
The court finds that the following property is clearly, and in its entirety, Lynn's separate 
property, and should be awarded to him free of any claim by Cathie; 
- Devon Energy Corp shares 
- Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Trust 
- McCormick Oil, LLC 
The court finds that Cathie's jewelry is her sole and separate property, with no value to be 
assigned in the overall allocation of assets. To the extent the parties cannot agree on the 
disposition of remaining personal property, Cathie shall prepare two lists of approximately equal 
value, and Lynn shall choose which list he wishes to claim. 
Cathie shall receive her Honda, with an assigned net value of $5,816, subject to the 
indebtedness thereon, and that sum is deemed a marital asset in the final balancing of the 
disposition. The other vehicles are accounted for in the disposition of Foster Rentals, the owner 
or lessee of said vehicles. 
The parlies agree, and it should be ordered, that the Summit Watch Marriott Timeshare 
will be sold, with net proceeds to be divided equally. 
The Anna Martin loan (principal only) related to the Provo house is a joint obligation. 
Ail other loans from Anna Martin should be Lynn's sole responsibility, for which he shall 
receive no credit in the final allocation of marital assets. 
Attorney's Fees 
Both parties have incurred substantial fees for attorney's and expert witnesses. Cathie 
argues that Lynn should pay all or part of her fees. While neither party in this case will be 
destitute after the property is allocated, payment of fees will be a significant burden. Lynn has 
already paid $11,000 of Cathie's fees, and because of the court's rulings regarding premarital 
property, he will have a larger estate than Cathie In addition, although the court has rejected the 
strongly urged claim that Lynn either can or should work for many more years at his prior level 
of effort and productivity, he possesses in the short-term a greater earning capacity than Cathie. 
For these reasons, the court finds that Lynn should provide some further assistance with Cathie's 
reasonable and necessary fees. Her fees and costs, including expert witnesses, exceed 
$100,000.00. They are not all reasonable. Particularly with respect to the accounting expert, the 
court has seldom seen less credible analysis nor a more blatantly overworked file, with virtually 
no ultimate advancement of the client's position When the expert's evidence (which was 
overwhelmingly passionate advocacy, not expert analysis) was considered in its totality, it did 
virtually nothing to aid the court's determination of the issues. In addition, both the expert and 
petitioner's counsel chose to advance novel theories at significant cost in legal and accounting 
services to the client. The court does not wish to discourage creative lawyering, but neither docs 
the court wish to encourage counsel or experts to risk such significant client resources on a 
longshot, in the hope that, even if unsuccessful, the other party will pay the bill. 
Respondent shall pay $25,000.00 of petitioner's fees, with a credit for the $11,000.00 
already paid. In addition, if Lynn has paid his own fees or all or part of the $11.000, from Foster 
Rentals, and if that amount is not included in the loans from Foster Rentals that Lynn is required 
to repay, he shall reimburse petitioner for said amounts, if any, in the final settlement of this 
matter 
Balancing Entry 
After calculation of all amounts awarded as part of the marital estate, the final balancing 
shall be accomplished by adjusting the allocation of the parties' interests in Foster Rentals. 
DATED 24th day of December, 2001. 
By the Court: 
Robert fc.. Hilder, District Court Judge 
